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ABSTRACT: Many have argued that unified theories ought to be pursued wherever possible. We deny this on the basis 
of social-epistemological and decision-theoretic considerations. Consequently, those seeking a more ubiquitous 
role for unification must either attend to the scientific community’s social structure in greater detail than has 
been the case, and/or radically revise their conception of unification.
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RESUMEN: Son muchos los que han defendido que deberían buscarse teorías unificadas siempre que sea posible. Noso-
tros lo negamos a partir de consideraciones socio-epistemológicas y de teoría de la decisión. En consecuencia, 
aquellos que busquen un papel más omnipresente para la unificación han de prestar un mayor grado de aten-
ción a la estructura social de la comunidad científica del que se le ha prestado, y/o revisar radicalmente su con-
cepción de la unificación.
Palabras clave: unificación, epistemología social, teoría de la decisión, ciencia, búsqueda de teorías.
1. Introduction
Unification is hotly debated in the philosophy of science. Much of the debate concerns 
its status as a desideratum of inquiry: is unification a fruit that all of our scientific pur-
suits ought to bear? Most parties in these debates assume that unification has been fruitful 
in some domains, and less fruitful in others. “Unificationists” claim that the latter inquir-
ies should nevertheless treat unification as a desideratum. Non-reductionists and pluralists 
deny this claim1.
Such debates rarely countenance the social interactions between scientists required to 
produce a scientific theory. This paper argues that, unless some important social-epistemo-
logical questions are answered, it can be rational to forgo the pursuit of unification, even 
when unification promises the greatest cognitive benefit. After setting the stage (Sections 2 
and 3), we argue that a unified theory promising greater cognitive benefits but also requir-
ing cooperation between scientists with different specializations can be less rational to pur-
1  Compare: “Monists might admit that a plurality of approaches and models meet appropriate scientific 
standards (or satisfy the corresponding epistemic values) but insist that this is only because today’s sci-
ence is incomplete. But we do not believe that the plurality in today’s science is necessarily a temporary 
state of affairs” Kellert, Stephen H., Helen E. Longino, and C. Kenneth Waters. 2006. Scientific Plural-
ism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press..
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sue than a less unified theory promising lower cognitive benefits but requiring no such co-
operation (Section 4).
While we provide no solution to this “puzzle,” our view entails that the value of unified 
theories has a distinctively social-epistemological element that has been largely overlooked. 
We regard our challenge as an invitation for unificationists (and interested social episte-
mologists) to examine the social conditions that would make unification a more robust de-
sideratum of science. In this regard, our challenge is not intended as decisive, but rather as 
placing new burdens of proof upon those who would seek a more prominent role for unifi-
cation.
2. Preliminaries About Theory Pursuit and Unification
We begin by clarifying four features of our account: theory-pursuit (§2.1), fields and re-
search units (§2.2), unification (§2.3), and the concept of interfield ‘hooks’ and ‘latches’ 
(§2.4). These ideas will inform our argument in Section 4, where we present our social-
epistemological concerns.
2.1. Theory Pursuit
In discussing unification as a desideratum or aim of scientific inquiry, we take the funda-
mental issue to be whether or not scientists should pursue unified theories, not whether 
they should believe such theories. Believing a theory means taking it as true; pursuing a 
theory means allocating resources towards its further development. Pursuit might in-
volve testing the theory, refining its hypotheses, or applying for grants to undertake such 
tasks.
Belief and pursuit are distinct stances towards a theory. Scientists can believe theories 
without pursuing them, e.g. if they think the theory is true and requires no further develop-
ment. Scientists can also pursue theories without believing them. This might happen sim-
ply because pursuit keeps them gainfully employed; less cynically, it may also occur if they 
are undecided about the veracity of a theory, and the pursuit promises to shed light on this 
issue. Our model is compatible with agents pursuing a theory while adopting any doxastic 
state towards that theory.
Consequently, the rational standards for believing a theory differ from the rational 
standards for pursuing a theory. Roughly stated, the standards of rational belief concern 
evidence, while the standards of rational pursuit concern utility. Of course, scientists derive 
high utility from evidential considerations, so pursuit does not proceed entirely independ-
ently of epistemic considerations. In the interests of generality, we will not take a substan-
tive stance on how scientists should assign utility. Thus, readers are allowed to make these 
assignments as epistemically high-minded or grubbily pragmatic as they see fit; regardless of 
these considerations, our conclusion follows.
2.2. Fields and Research Units
By and large, it is fruitful to view the decision-makers in our model as slightly larger units of 
analysis than individual scientists; theories are pursued not only by individual researchers 
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but also by labs and teams of scientists. To that end, we will use Darden and Maull’s (1977, 
44) notion of a scientific field, defined as follows:
… a central problem, a domain consisting of items taken to be facts related to that problem, gen-
eral explanatory factors and goals providing expectations as to how the problem is to be solved, 
techniques and methods, and, sometimes, but not always, concepts, laws and theories which are 
related to the problem and which attempt to realize the explanatory goals [… and often,] a special 
vocabulary.
Darden and Maull distinguish their conceptual account of fields from sociological or in-
stitutional accounts. So construed, fields are abstract entities, or at the very least, con-
ceptual products that can be distinguished from the humans that produce them. Since 
we are interested in both the conceptual and the social aspects of fields, we will follow 
Darden and Maull’s use of the term ‘field’ and introduce the term ‘research unit’ to de-
note the group of scientists associated with a field who engage in cooperative activities 
with respect to theory pursuit. These activities involve shared deliberation, shared values, 
or shared intentions. Throughout this paper, we use the terms ‘scientist’ and ‘research 
unit’ interchangeably. However, our interest is primarily with research units, which con-
sist of scientists cooperating in the pursuit of theories, rather than with individual scien-
tists per se.
Like individual scientists, research units pursue theories by testing those theories, re-
fining hypotheses and models, applying for grants, allocating resources towards the devel-
opment of those theories, etc. Darden and Maull’s criteria of a field help to distinguish 
between a group of scientists who make up a single research unit and those who do not: 
members of a research unit have common problems, explanatory goals, techniques, etc. Ad-
ditionally, certain social explanations will apply to research units, but not to groups of sci-
entists that are not part of a common research unit. For instance, members of a research 
unit can function as cooperative parts of a whole; scientists who do not make up a research 
unit do not (though they might still engage in productive collaboration with other research 
units).
There are multiple ways of delimiting fields, e.g. by having finer- or coarser-grained 
ways of describing problems, explanatory goals, and techniques. Consequently, research 
units assume many different institutional shapes in scientific practice. They might con-
sist of a laboratory team that distributes research labour among its members; a whole sci-
entific field (e.g. population geneticists); or a professional organization (e.g. the Ameri-
can Physical Society’s Division of Condensed Matter Physics). At the smallest extreme, 
a research unit might consist of a single scientist. Membership in research units is fluid, 
and scientists can be members of more than one research unit at a time. Moreover, a cer-
tain amount of imprecision is to be expected. How many research units are there, for 
example, in a large research organization like CERN? While there may be no precise 
answer to this, it seems clear that it is a far smaller number than the total number of in-
dividual scientists affiliated with the organization. While we will not conjecture any fur-
ther about how research units are individuated, we assume that they track with however 
scientific communities divide themselves in the context of theory-pursuit, save for the 
simplifying assumption that an individual scientist is a member of exactly one research 
unit.
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In summary, we will be focusing on research units’ pursuit of unified theories. We will 
ultimately argue that, unless more social-epistemological work is done, it can be rational for 
research units to forgo this pursuit, even when unified theories provide the greatest cogni-
tive benefit.
2.3. Unification
In order to argue that unification is sometimes rational to forgo, we must also clarify what 
we mean by unification. We aim for as general an account of unification as possible, so that 
our social-epistemological challenge applies to most (if not all) accounts of unification cur-
rently in the philosophical marketplace of ideas.
Let a theory h fit a phenomenon or item of evidence e only if h stands in a scientifically 
significant and accepted relationship to e. Candidates for fitting relationships include con-
firmation, deduction, explanation, prediction, etc. Then the transition from one stage of 
scientific inquiry t1 to another such stage t2 marks an increase in unification if and only if:
(U1) Fewer theories at t2 are required to fit the same phenomena than those required 
at t1; or
(U2) The same number of theories fit more phenomena at t2 than at t1; or
(U3) Fewer theories fit more phenomena at t2 than at t1.
For simplicity’s sake, we restrict our attention to (U1) and we assume that the set of phe-
nomena to be fit is finite and fixed over time. We also assume that a unique theory fits any 
subset of phenomena. This omits the possibility of scientists pursuing different theories 
that fit the same collection of phenomena, but the variety of theories that can be pursued 
remains sufficiently rich to capture interesting ideas about unification.
As simplistic as this picture appears, it suffices for our purposes. In motivating the need 
for a social epistemology that is relatively invariant to the account of unification being en-
dorsed, we thereby allow the reader to fill in the “fitting” relation and to count and define 
“theories” and “evidence” in whatever manner furnishes her favourite account of unifica-
tion (Table 1).
Instead of fighting turf wars over the nature of unification, our primary focus concerns 
aspects of unification most relevant to scientists’ decisions about theory pursuit. To that 
end, imagine a scientific community in which each research unit deliberates about pursuing 
one of many theories that differ in both the degree and kind of unification they potentially 
offer. First, local theories fit only phenomena within the research unit’s field. Second, cos-
mopolitan theories fit phenomena both within the research unit’s field and in other fields. 
This is a sliding scale: maximally cosmopolitan theories fit at least one phenomenon from 
every field at a given time.
Unification has another dimension. Theories might be grand, and fit all of the phe-
nomena within their purviews; or they might be humble, fitting only a subset of these phe-
nomena. As with cosmopolitanism, grandeur comes in degrees. At one extreme, maximally 
humble or parochial theories fit only one phenomenon. At the other extreme, maximally 
grand or global theories fit all of the phenomena. Localism and cosmopolitanism are thus 
defined relative to the fields of scientists, while grandeur and humility are defined relative 
to the total set of phenomena.
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Table 1. A sketch of how the leading accounts of unification would be subsumed 
within our framework
Account of Unification Theory Phenomena Fitting Relationship
Bartelborth 2002 Theoretical Models Pre-Theoretical Models Embedding (Explanation)
Kitcher 1989 Argument Patterns Explananda Deduction (Explanation)2
Morrison 19993 Theoretical Param-
eters
Phenomena Necessity, Mathematical 
Structure
Myrvold 20034 Hypotheses Evidence Conditional Probability, 
Informational Relevance
Schurz and Lambert 1994; 
Schurz 1999
Premises Explananda Inference
Thagard 1978 Hypotheses Classes of Facts Explanation
2 3 4
To illustrate these ideas, consider a simplified model in which there are only three phenom-
ena e1, e2, and e3, and two research units A and B. A’s field consists of e1 and e2; B’s, of e35. 
Then the possible theories would be: h1, h2, h3, h12, h13, h23, h123. Here, the subscripts refer 
to the phenomena the theory fits, e.g. h23 fits e2 and e3. Using our earlier terminology, h1, h2, 
and h3 are parochial theories; and h123 is a global theory. Given A and B’s fields, h1, h2, h12, 
and h3 are local theories, while h13, h23, and h123 are cosmopolitan theories.
We do not assume cosmopolitan theories inherently increase unification. However, so long 
as there is more than one field in a scientific community, at least one cosmopolitan theory is al-
ways grander than any local alternative. In this simple model, h123 is the only cosmopolitan the-
ory grander than any local alternative. Consequently, so long as there are two distinct research 
units, the challenge that we raise to unification can —at least in principle— arise.
In what follows, we will be focusing primarily on the conditions under which it is more 
rational to pursue local theories rather than cosmopolitan theories. We return to these de-
2 Both Bartelborth and Kitcher provide unificationist theories of explanation. Consequently, if an ex-
planandum can be embedded/deduced from a theoretical model/argument pattern that is a member of 
a unifying theory or “explanatory store,” it is explained by an application of that model/pattern.
3 While Morrison states that “there is no ‘unified’ account of unity—a trait that makes it immune from 
general analysis,” this entry captures one kind of unification that might not be subsumed under other 
entries, and springs from her discussion that “true cases of unification… have a mechanism or parameter 
represented in the theory that fulfills the role of a necessary condition required for seeing the connec-
tion among the phenomena” Morrison, Margaret. 1999. Unifying Scientific Theories : Physical Concepts 
and Mathematical Structures. New York: Cambridge University Press, page 32.
4 See also McGrew, Timothy. 2003. “Confirmation, Heuristics, and Explanatory Reasoning.” British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54: 553-567; Schupbach, Jonah N. 2005. “On a Bayesian Analysis 
of the Virtue of Unification.” Philosophy of Science 72: 594-607.
5 We use this notation only to illustrate how we classify different degrees and kinds of unification; it does 
not figure in what follows.
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tails below. For now, let us briefly discuss how we will be treating the other dimension of 
unification—the degrees of grandeur. We will be assuming that, ceteris paribus, a grander 
theory is preferable to a humbler theory. Presumably, unificationists would agree on this 
point, since, according to (U1)-(U3) above, a grander theory is more unifying. The ques-
tion remains whether it is also more rational to pursue cosmopolitan theories than local 
theories; our answer will be that there are many cases in which it is not. Moreover, we will 
be focusing exclusively on the decision between pursuing between a grander cosmopolitan 
theory and a humbler local theory.
Because we are focusing on cosmopolitan unification, we assume that unification al-
ways involves two or more research units. Undoubtedly, this assumption is a simplification; 
there have been several “lone unifiers” throughout the history of science (e.g., Newton, 
Maxwell, Einstein)6. However, our claim is only existential, not universal: it is sometimes 
rational to forgo unification, even when it promises the greatest benefit. Correspondingly, 
our claim need not be too strong: sometimes unification requires multiple research units. 
On this front, there are many episodes in the history of science that required substantial 
coordination, e.g. the modern synthesis of evolutionary theory and genetics, the Standard 
Model in particle physics, the tectonic theory of continental drift, etc.
Additionally, it is not altogether clear that unificationists are well served by resisting 
our argument via appeal to lone unifiers. After all, it would then follow that unification 
is only worth pursuing independently of social conditions when a scientist on the order 
of Newton, Maxwell, or Einstein dedicates his or her research efforts towards unifica-
tion. Since few scientists can be presumed to match these figures’ talents, it would then 
follow that most scientists ought not to pursue unified theories. Consequently, we take 
the assumption that some cases of unification require multiple research units to be de-
fensible.
2.4. Interfield Hooks and Latches
On the assumption that unification involves multiple fields, it then seems quite reasonable 
that some research units must devote special efforts to effecting the desired unification. Let 
an interfield hook be the desired product of these efforts. Each hook can be accepted or re-
jected by other research units. If one research unit accepts another’s hook, we will say that 
the former has latched onto the hook. We will first define interfield hooks in the abstract, 
and then provide several examples from the history of science. We will then do the same 
with interfield latches.
Above, we defined a field as consisting of shared: (i) problems7, (ii) domains, (iii) ex-
planatory patterns, (iv) methods, (v) concepts, and (vi) vocabulary. Call items (i)-(vi) the 
elements of the field. Then, research unit A builds an interfield hook to research unit B’s 
field if and only if:
(H1) A either uses some of the elements in its field to solve some of the problems in 
B’s field, or uses some of the elements in B’s field to solve some of the problems 
in its field;
6  We thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
7  We are including the fulfillment of ‘explanatory goals’ as a kind of problem to be solved.
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(H2) The solution to these problems increases unification in one of the ways pre-
scribed by (U1)-(U3) above8.
We will describe the problems that a hook is intended to solve as its characteristic problems. 
Darden and Maull (1977, 49) provide several examples of interfield hooks. To quote them 
at length:
(1) A field may provide a specification of the physical location of an entity or process 
postulated in another field. For example, in its earliest formulation, the chromo-
some theory of Mendelian heredity postulated that the Mendelian genes were in or 
on the chromosomes; cytology provided the physical location of the genes…
(2) A field may provide the physical nature of an entity or process postulated in an-
other field. Thus, for example, biochemistry provided the physical nature of the re-
pressor, an entity postulated in the operon theory.
(3) A field may investigate the structure of entities or processes, the function of which 
is investigated in another field. Physical chemistry provides the structure of mole-
cules whose function is described biochemically.
(4) Fields may be linked causally, the entities postulated in one field providing the 
causes of effects investigated in the other. For example, the theory of allosteric reg-
ulation provides a causal explanation of the interaction between the physicochemi-
cal structure of certain enzymes and a characteristic biochemical pattern of their 
activity.
These examples focus quite a bit on building hooks between domains (element ii, above), 
explanatory patterns (iii), and concepts (v). Consequently, they emphasize an important 
class of interfield hooks in which one research unit constructs a theory that purports to fit 
evidence in another field. There are many other kinds and examples of interfield hooks. For 
instance, in the modern synthesis of genetics and natural selection, Dobzhansky’s (1937) 
Genetics and the Origin of Species aimed to make the ideas of population genetics—often ex-
pressed in complex statistical notation and biological theory—accessible to field naturalists. 
In this way, the hook is primarily one of presenting a vocabulary that makes population ge-
netics relevant to field naturalists (element vi above).
Our argument in Section 4 assumes that the evidence in A’s field is unified with the 
evidence in B’s field only if A builds a hook and B “latches onto” that hook (or vice versa). 
This latching is basically B’s positive reception of A’s hook. More precisely, if A builds an 
interfield hook to B, then B latches onto that hook if and only if:
(L1) B accepts the way that A’s hook solves its characteristic problems; or
(L2) B modifies (elements in) its field so that A’s hook solves its characteristic prob-
lems in a manner that B accepts.
We will take the paradigmatic kind of latch to be one of testing whether a cosmopoli-
tan theory fits the evidence in the latching unit’s field9. Continuing with an earlier ex-
8  There is almost certainly a class of interfield relations that satisfy H1, but not H2. These are worthy of 
further exploration, but are incidental to the present paper’s concerns.
9  Returning to the previous section, this provides yet another reason to think that “lone unifiers” still re-
quire other scientists to effect unification. For instance, Einstein needed Eddington to test his prediction.
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ample, Dobzhansky’s work simply presented the findings of population genetics in a vo-
cabulary accessible to field naturalists. Field naturalists could have read and understood 
Dobzhansky’s hook, but then rejected the ideas of population genetics. Thus, latching 
was required to unify population genetics with field studies. For instance, by applying Do-
bzhansky’s ideas to his fieldwork on the birds of New Guinea, Ernst Mayr (1942) went on 
to write Systematics and the Origin of Species, one of the most influential texts of the mod-
ern synthesis of natural selection and genetics.
Latching may assume other forms. In some cases, it may involve something other than 
(perhaps in addition to) testing, e.g. developing methods and models that complement A’s 
hook, interdisciplinary collaboration, or extensive research in A’s field. In some cases, it 
may involve something substantially less labour-intensive than testing, e.g. simply accept-
ing A’s hook. This more ‘passive’ form of latching may seem to make B’s role in unification 
trivial. However, research units tend to have expertise and authority over their own fields. 
Consequently, if B does not accept A’s hook, then doubts or uncertainty about whether 
A’s cosmopolitan theory actually fits the evidence in B’s field are warranted. Thus, we will 
say that A’s theory stands in a questionable fit to B’s evidence when B does not latch onto 
A’s hook.
Finally, we note that a research unit builds or latches onto a hook only if it pursues a 
cosmopolitan theory. Lest this seem too strong, recall that pursuit of a theory means allo-
cating resources towards its further development. Building a hook to another field clearly 
fits this description, since it involves marshalling resources from multiple fields. Latching 
is also a cosmopolitan pursuit, for its paradigmatic form involves testing whether elements 
from another field solve problems in one’s own field. Since testing of this sort requires re-
sources, latching also entails pursuit of the theory.
To summarize, we are interested in whether a research unit is always rational in pur-
suing a unifying theory. Given the way that we have defined unification, this question 
amounts to whether a research unit is always more rational in pursuing a grander cosmo-
politan theory instead of a humbler local theory. Moreover, we assume that producing a 
cosmopolitan theory requires one research unit building an interfield hook, i.e. determin-
ing which elements in one field are relevant to another, and another research accepting or 
latching onto the central features of that hook.
3. A Decision-Theoretic Model of Theory Choice
Recall that our main thesis is that it is sometimes rational not to pursue unification, even 
when unified theories provide the greatest benefits. What is meant by “rational” and 
“benefit”? According to the basic tenets of “economic approaches to science” (Strevens 
2011), it is rational to pursue a theory h if and only if pursuing h maximizes expected 
payoff. In turn, the expected payoff of pursuing h is a function of the costs of pursuing h, 
the benefits provided if the pursuit is successful, and the probability that pursuing h will 
succeed10.
10  Included in consideration of costs are factors such as the amount of resources it might take to success-
fully produce the theory, the amount of time it might take for the theory to be produced, and so forth.
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Here and throughout, “rational” means subjectively rational (likewise for “cost,” “bene-
fit,” and “probability”). In other words, our account only appeals to scientists’ mental states 
(even if these states are objectively irrational or unjustified). Note further that the theory 
h is defined as a theory that fits some set of phenomena E; pursuing h means attempting 
to produce a theory that fits E. That pursuit is successful if and only if a theory is produced 
that actually fits E.
We can model the decision problem faced by some research unit A as follows: A has to 
choose one theory out of a set H of possible theories to pursue. A’s choice is rational if the 
expected value of pursuing that theory is at least as great as that of pursuing any other the-
ory in H.
Suppose performing an action h can produce one of a set of outcomes O, and that 
a probability function P assigns to each outcome o  O a probability P(o), such that 
0 c P(o) c 1 and Σ P(o) = 1. Suppose also that the cost of performing an action is given by 
a cost function Z(h) (where the cost is the same regardless of which outcome is produced), 
and that the value of each outcome can be given by a value function V(o). Then we can cal-
culate the expected value U(h) of performing h as U(h) = –Z(h) + Σo∈o P(o) . V(o).
For each research unit, the set of actions corresponds to the set of theories H; U(h) 
then represents the expected value (to the research unit) if h is pursued, and each research 
unit thus aims to maximize the value of U(h). As mentioned earlier, we assume that scien-
tists value evidence (among other things). Consequently, the amount of evidence fit by the 
theory h influences, but does not determine, the function U(h).
The set H can be partitioned into two subsets, HL and HC . HL represents the local 
theories that research unit A can pursue, such that for every theory hL  HL the phenom-
ena fit by hL are all in A’s field, while HC represents the cosmopolitan theories that A can 
pursue, such that for each theory hC  HC at least one phenomenon fit by hC is not in A’s 
field. Ultimately, we will compare the optimal local strategy hL* to the optimal cosmopoli-
tan strategy hC*, where U(hL*) s U(hL) for all hL  HL and U(hC*) s U(hC) for all hC  HC. 
Given the discussion in Section 2.3, optimal cosmopolitan strategies aim to produce 
grand cosmopolitan theories; the optimal local strategies, humble local theories. If cir-
cumstances exist in which it is more rational for a research unit to pursue an optimal lo-
cal strategy over an optimal cosmopolitan strategy, then our challenge to unificationism 
succeeds.
Consider first the subset HL of local theories. For each theory hL  HL, there are two 
possible outcomes if a scientist pursues it:
o1. Local Failure: the pursuit of hL fails to produce a theory that fits the relevant evi-
dence in the research unit’s field; or
o2. Local Success: the pursuit of hL succeeds in producing a local theory that fits the rel-
evant evidence in the research unit’s field.
In general, U(hL) depends on the values associated with o1 and o2, on the respective prob-
abilities of these outcomes, and on the costs associated with pursuing a local theory. Label 
the values associated with these two outcomes of hL* as V(o1) = 0 and V(o2) = l11. Further, 
11  We set the value of local failure as 0 for convenience. Our conclusion does not change if we set the 
value of local failure as another value, so long as it is less than the value of local success.
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let p be the probability that the pursuit of hL* succeeds (i.e. that o2 is brought about), and 
1 – p be the probability that the pursuit fails (i.e. that o1 is brought about). Finally, label the 
cost associated with pursuing hL* as Z(hL*) = zL. We can now calculate the expected utility 
of pursuing hL* as
U(hL*) = (p . l) – zL.
Next, consider the subset HC of cosmopolitan theories. For each theory hC  HC, consider 
three possible outcomes:
o3. Complete Failure: the pursuit of hC fails to produce a theory that fits the relevant 
evidence within or outside of the research unit’s field, or
o4. Questionable Success: the pursuit of hC produces a theory that fits the relevant phe-
nomena in the research unit’s field, but that questionably fits some of the relevant 
phenomena in other research units’ fields; or
o5. Unquestionable Success: the pursuit of hC produces a theory that fits the relevant 
phenomena in the research unit’s field, and that bears no questionable fits to the 
relevant phenomena in other research units’ fields.
As discussed in Section 2.4, questionable fits arise when affected research units do not ac-
cept how the cosmopolitan theory bears on their field (i.e. they don’t “latch onto the 
hook”). A questionable success is when a research unit pursues a theory that results in ques-
tionable fits. By contrast, unquestionable success is achieved when all affected units accept 
how the cosmopolitan theory bears on their field. Unquestionable successes are successful 
cosmopolitan theories, and are grander than either questionably or locally successful theo-
ries. In short, unquestionable successes are successful unifications.
Turning our attention to the optimal cosmopolitan theory hC*, let 1 – r be the proba-
bility of o3. Then r is the probability that the pursuit succeeds in some way —that is, r is the 
probability of either o4 or o5. Call rq the probability of o4 and ru the probability of o5, such 
that rq + ru = r. Denote the value of failure as V(o3) = 0, the value of questionable success 
as V(o4) = hCq, and the value of unquestionable success as V(o5) = hCu. Again, we assume for 
simplicity that the values of complete and local failure are the same, namely 0. Thus, we as-
sume that the value of a theory that fails to fit any relevant evidence is largely unaffected by 
its being local or cosmopolitan. Finally, we denote the cost of pursuing hC* as Z(hC*) = zC. 
Then the expected value of pursuing hC* is U(hC*) = (rq . hCq + ru . hCu) – zC.
Since it figures prominently below, consider one important factor in determining 
U(hC): the relative values of rq and ru. Holding the probability of failing to produce a cos-
mopolitan theory fixed at 1 – r, the probability of successfully producing a cosmopolitan 
theory of some kind is fixed at r. The value of that success depends on the ratio between 
rq and ru: the higher rq, the more the value of U(hC) will approach hCq, while the lower rq is, 
the more the value of U(hC) will approach hCu. Let us call the value k = ru/r the expectation 
of unification. The value of k will range from 0 to 1, and represents A’s judgment about the 
likelihood of o5 given that o3 does not occur—or, equivalently, the likelihood of o5 given ei-
ther o4 or o5.
We will argue below that social factors significantly influence k’s value. If this is right, 
and if there are values of k that favour pursuing local strategies to cosmopolitan strategies, 
then we can conclude that it is sometimes rational to forgo unification. In other words, 
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when faced with the choice between pursuing an optimal local strategy and pursuing an op-
timal cosmopolitan strategy, there are social conditions wherein the expected value of the 
former is greater than the expected value of the latter.
4. Social-Epistemological Challenges for Unificationists
With these clarifications and assumptions in hand, let us state the precise sense in which it 
is sometimes rational to forgo the pursuit of unified theories, even when they provide the 
greatest cognitive benefit:
The Limits of Unification Thesis (LU): There exist research units with sets H and P such that 
U(hL*) > U(hC*) and l < hCu12.
In other words, the utility of an optimal local strategy is sometimes greater than that of an 
optimal cosmopolitan strategy, even when the value of a local success is lower than that of 
an unquestionable, and hence cosmopolitan, success.
Specifically, we will argue that any plausible response to this challenge will invoke so-
cial-epistemological considerations that have, to date, not been forthcoming. Thus, we are 
challenging the claim that the value of pursuing unified theories is independent of any so-
cial conditions. So far as we know, this fairly characterizes every proponent of unification-
ism (e.g. the authors listed in Table 1). Note that this modest position is compatible with 
the claim that unification’s value is not ubiquitous. Of course, if our arguments undermine 
even this modest position, they apply a fortiori to the stronger thesis that unification’s value 
is not only independent of social considerations, but is also a desideratum of all theories. 
Should either the moderate or the strong unificationist grant that the value in pursuing a 
unified theory depends on social conditions, she will have conceded precisely the point we 
are underscoring.
Our argument will proceed as follows. First, in Section 4.1, we will argue that the con-
ditions that justify LU depend on research units’ expectation of unification —i.e., the pa-
rameter k, as described in the previous section. Then, we will argue that the expectation of 
unification is deeply tied to social-epistemological considerations in Section 4.2. It thereby 
follows that whether it is rational to pursue unification is a social-epistemological question.
4.1. An Argument for LU
There are cheap ways to establish LU: one could simply jerry-rig the probabilities, costs, 
and benefits in an ad hoc manner to get the result. This should convince no one. To that 
end, we will make assumptions that either grant the unificationist a favourable dialectical 
position, or are independently plausible. Thus, when we show that it is rational to forgo the 
pursuit of unified theories, we cannot be charged with tilting at windmills or burning down 
straw men.
12  Strictly speaking, it only needs to be the case that the pursuit of a local theory is at least as rational as 
the pursuit of a cosmopolitan theory; that said, we are happy to grant to the unificationist the case in 
which the values are exactly equal.
442 Randall Harp and Kareem Khalifa
Theoria 30/3 (2015): 431-447
Having said that, we wish to underscore a few things. First, we are making an existen-
tial claim: it is sometimes rational to forgo unification, even when it promises greater bene-
fit. Hence, counterexamples to these assumptions —especially the ones that are unfavour-
able to the unificationist— must show that our assumptions never obtain in the history of 
science. We suspect that these kinds of rebuttals are unlikely to succeed. Indeed, we suspect 
that the assumptions that are not merely made for the sake of the unificationist are rou-
tinely true. Thus, in talking about the relative value, cost, and probabilities of different out-
comes in this section, we assume implicit ceteris paribus clauses throughout.
Let us begin with one of LU’s two conjuncts:
(LU1) l < hCu
LU1 states that the value or benefits of a local success are less than those of an unques-
tionable success. This claim is both “unificationist-friendly” and independently plausi-
ble. Clearly, any unificationist should accept this claim, since a local success is less unifying 
than an unquestionable success. Moreover, there are independent reasons for accepting 
LU1. An unquestionable success fits with more phenomena than a local success, and we 
have defined a fit as any scientifically significant and accepted relationship between a the-
ory and a phenomenon. More fits clearly are valuable—scientists clearly want to explain, 
predict, etc. more phenomena than fewer. From this, it follows that unquestionably suc-
cessful theories stand in more valuable relationships to the phenomena than local suc-
cesses. Indeed, this reasoning suggests that unquestionable success is greater than any of 
the four alternatives (local failure, local success, complete failure, questionable success) 
discussed in Section 3.
With this, let us turn to the second conjunct of LU, which states there are conditions 
where the optimal local strategy is of greater utility than the optimal cosmopolitan strategy:
(LU2) U(hL*) > U(hC*)
Now, given the discussion in Section 3, this is equivalent to:
(p . l) – zL > r . (hCq + hCu) –zC
Given LU1, we know that the benefits or values of pursuing a grander cosmopolitan theory 
must be greater than those of pursuing a humbler local theory. This is good news for the 
unificationist, since the remaining elements of the decision problem —the costs and prob-
abilities— are most plausibly construed as favouring humbler local theories.
First, the costs of pursuing a grander theory are greater than those of pursuing a hum-
bler theory. For each phenomenon e, ascertaining whether a theory fits e requires an ex-
penditure of resources (time, effort, thought, equipment, etc.). Since grand theories require 
more of these expenditures, they cost more to pursue than humble theories.
Second, the costs of pursuing a cosmopolitan theory appear greater than those of pur-
suing a local theory. In particular, pursuing cosmopolitan theories requires the develop-
ment of hooks and latches, which consume resources. By contrast, only pursuing a local 
theory requires neither hooks nor latches. For instance, when pursuing local theories, sci-
entists are familiar with the relevant phenomena, leading hypotheses, etc. but this is not the 
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case with cosmopolitan theories. Consequently, the scientist must allocate resources to fa-
miliarize herself in the adjacent field. Costs, then, increase monotonically along both the 
humble-grand axis and the local-cosmopolitan axis. Thus, the cost of pursuing a grander 
cosmopolitan theory is greater than the cost of pursuing a humbler local theory:
zC > zL
However, even here we will be charitable to unificationists, and assume that these costs are 
vastly outstripped by the benefits of producing a grand cosmopolitan theory. To do other-
wise is essentially to magnify the disincentives for pursuing unified theories. Since our goal 
is to show that one can rationally forgo pursuit of a unified theory even when its cognitive 
benefits are substantially greater than the alternatives, we readily downplay the greater costs 
of pursuing a grand cosmopolitan theory. Given the preceding, this entails that the net gain 
of an unquestionable success is greater than that of a local success, and the net gain of a lo-
cal failure is greater than that of a complete failure.
With the relative values and costs of the different outcomes spelled out, all that re-
mains is the probability that a research unit assigns to these outcomes. The probability r of 
producing either a questionable or an unquestionable success is smaller than that of a local 
success. After all, fitting a theory to more evidence is harder than fitting it to less. Never-
theless, we will assume that this difference is slight —once again in the name of a being dia-
lectically kind. Thus:
p > r
If things were to end here, LU2, and hence LU, would already seem plausible: it is a wash 
whether the greater value of an unquestionable success offsets its greater costs and its lower 
probability of success. Presumably, sometimes it does not, which renders the pursuit of a lo-
cal, non-unifying theory more rational. If that is correct, then LU2 is proven.
However, we are not content to let things rest there. In particular, we will now argue 
that k, the expectation of unification, is the crucial fulcrum. To see this, consider a limit-
ing case, namely when there is no expectation of unification. In such a case, a research unit 
expects that no other research unit will accept the way it reconfigures various interfield ele-
ments, i.e. it expects that no other research unit will latch onto its hook. In this case, k = 0. 
As a result, r = rq. This in turn, yields the following:
U(hC*) = r . hCq –zC
We have already argued that r < p and that zC > zL. Consequently, since we are (provision-
ally) assuming that k = 0, if hCq c 1, then U(hC*) < U(hL*). In other words, we must show 
that questionable cosmopolitan successes are no more valuable than local successes. This is 
plausible, and may well be unificationist-friendly, since there is a good case to be made that 
questionable cosmopolitan successes are strictly less valuable than local successes, i.e. hCq < l. 
By definition, questionably successful theories have questionable fits, which presumably di-
minish their value. Indeed, because questionably successful theories fail to apply to the phe-
nomena to which they purport to fit, something is frequently wrong with them, e.g. they 
make false predictions. This, in turn, raises doubts as to whether the fits they actually mus-
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ter are bona fide or merely fortuitous. By contrast, a local success fits everything that it pur-
ports to fit, so these doubts need not arise.
Indeed, we are hard pressed to find historical examples of questionable successes that 
were still held in high regard by the scientific community. Relatively close cousins might be 
the “selective successes” used in some prominent defenses of scientific realism (e.g., Kitcher 
2001; Psillos 1999; Worrall 1989)13. Perhaps these examples can be repurposed to moti-
vate questionable successes. For instance, while the ether theory failed to unify optical, elec-
tromagnetic, and gravitational phenomena, certain models of the ether theory fit their phe-
nomena, e.g. Fresnel’s theory of diffraction.
However, even here we have some reservations, for these arguments take a relatively 
“long view” of the history of science, and it’s unclear whether scientists take a similarly 
long view when pursuing theories. Presumably, theories that purport to unify but that only 
partly fit their evidence are frequently discarded quite abruptly, and hence are unlikely to 
be salient when one takes a long view. Nevertheless, for the scientist who pursues such a 
theory, they are very salient —perhaps even more so when they are so quickly discarded. 
Indeed, when Fresnel pursued his theory, it seemed to be something much closer to an un-
questionable success —problems with the ether theory would not reach fever pitch for dec-
ades.
Despite these worries, we are bracketing these concerns so as to give the unification-
ist as soft of a landing as possible. Thus, we hold that questionable cosmopolitan successes 
can be as valuable as local successes. With this, we have shown that it can be more rational 
to pursue a humbler, local (i.e. non-unifying theory) rather than its grander cosmopolitan 
counterpart. The crucial condition is that k = 0, i.e. the research unit does not expect oth-
ers to accept its reconfiguration of interfield elements, i.e. to latch onto its hook. Thus, we 
have established LU.
However, if LU could only be true under these conditions, then it would be of limited 
interest. After all, it seems implausible that one segment of the scientific community would 
expect no other segment to accept a theory that was relevant to the latter’s field. As we shall 
eventually argue, higher values of k can also underwrite LU. Indeed, it is somewhat tempt-
ing to suggest that even when there are extremely high expectations of unification, it is still 
not altogether obvious that it is rational to pursue a grand cosmopolitan theory. At its max-
imum, k = 1. This would mean that a research unit expects all of the other research units to 
latch onto its hook, i.e. to find it an acceptable way to reconfigure elements in their field. In 
this case, r = ru. This, in turn, entails the following:
U(hC*) = r . hCu –zC
We have argued that r < p, hCu > l and zC > zL. It does not thereby follow that 
U(hC*) > U(hL*) when k = 1, for even here, a cosmopolitan theory’s greater costs and lower 
probability of success might eclipse its greater benefits. However, we think that this would 
be unfair to the unificationist. Presumably, when k = 1, the conditions are ripe for pursuing 
a unified theory. Consequently, we assume that the benefits of an unquestionable success 
13  We stress that the paper is non-committal about the scientific realism debate; we are only using these 
examples to make a point about unification.
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are so much greater than those of a local success, that it outshines the former’s greater costs 
and lower probability of success. Thus, we grant that when k = 1, it is more rational to pur-
sue a grander cosmopolitan theory than a humbler local theory.
Despite the various assumptions we have made on behalf of the unificationist, there 
will still be values of k greater than 0 that make it rational to forgo unification, i.e. that will 
justify LU. Specifically, there is some value of k between 0 and 1 such that the expected 
value of pursuing a local theory is equal to the expected value of pursuing a cosmopolitan 
theory. If the actual expectation of unification is below that level, then the expected payoff 
of local pursuit is higher, so the rational agent should act accordingly. In all such cases, LU 
holds. By contrast, if the expectation of unification is higher, then it is rational to pursue a 
cosmopolitan, unifying theory.
At this point, one may object that unification can be achieved without being pursued. 
If this objection were sound, then the expectation of unification is irrelevant. For example, 
it might be thought that scientists might only pursue local theories that serve as inputs or 
fodder for subsequent unification. However, this merely postpones the problem, for even 
if earlier scientists don’t face the decision problem we have just described, subsequent sci-
entists who unify these local theories do. Specifically, later unifiers will have to build hooks 
that latch onto other fields, and the probability of this succeeding is precisely what the ex-
pectation of unification represents.
4.2. Social-Epistemological Considerations
Thus, we have seen that whether or not it is rational to pursue a unifying theory depends 
primarily on what we have called the expectation of unification. In other words, it depends 
on a research unit’s expectation that it will build a hook and other research units will latch 
onto that hook. Stripping this of our handy labels, this means that the rationality of pursu-
ing a unifying theory depends on scientists’ expectations that they can reconfigure the ele-
ments in their fields and adjacent fields in a manner that other scientists will find accept-
able.
To complete our story, we point out that this is a fundamentally social-epistemolog-
ical question. It fundamentally concerns the kind of trust that scientists have towards 
each other; how the scientific community divides itself and its labour into fields and re-
search units; the scientific incentives for interdisciplinary work; whether the scientific 
community produced a sufficient amount of background knowledge to support cosmo-
politan theories; the compatibility of elements between different fields; the mechanisms 
and practices of accepting and testing claims from other fields; and so on. There might be 
other factors affecting k. The crucial point for us is that however k is determined, it appears 
to be inextricably connected to social-epistemological factors that unificationists have not ad-
equately developed.
5. Conclusion
We have argued that even if a cosmopolitan theory fits more evidence (i.e. it is more unify-
ing), it may be more rational to pursue a local (i.e. less unifying) theory. This occurs when 
scientists fail to know whether other scientists will cooperate in the pursuit of the grand 
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cosmopolitan theory. Thus, since grand cosmopolitan theories are the most unifying, it ap-
pears that other, less unified theories can be equally rational to pursue.
Moreover, some of our assumptions about the structure of scientific communities may 
well understate the tractability of the problem. In particular, both cosmopolitanism (local-
ism) and grandeur (humility) admit of degrees, so a fully general model would give agents 
far more theories to pursue than our basic model. So, it is also possible that a less idealized 
account of the scientific community makes it even more puzzling that scientists should al-
ways pursue unified theories (and, in particular, global theories).
Nevertheless, we do not claim that our challenge to the value of unification is insur-
mountable, but we do take it to be instructive, for it appears that any rebuttal to our chal-
lenge will involve revising our assumptions about the social structure of scientific commu-
nities, or our assumptions about unification. We end by suggesting future lines of research 
in which either of these assumptions might be challenged, and the ramifications of these 
challenges to the epistemic value of unification.
First, suppose that our assumptions about the social structure of scientific communi-
ties are false, or that some other decision- or game-theoretic structure would adequately de-
scribe scientists’ pursuit of unified theories. Then, this still concedes the point that we have 
underscored but that has hitherto been ignored: unification depends on the social structure 
of the scientific community. Consequently, we welcome this kind of critique.
To make this point more precise: one might think that there are two (possibly compet-
ing) sets of interests involved when research units deliberate about which theory to pursue: 
there are the interests of the scientific community as a whole, and there are the interests 
of each research unit specifically. Given that our paper has analysed deliberation from the 
standpoint of research units, our conclusion has been that it is sometimes rational for re-
search units not to pursue unifying theories. We might think, however, that an important 
related problem is that of finding a way to get research units to deliberate from the point 
of view of the scientific community as a whole, which would solve the decision problem by 
making only the pursuit of grand cosmopolitan views rational14. While we do not address 
this issue in this paper, it is noteworthy that most solutions to this problem involve chang-
ing the agential framework of the research units, which itself involves a type of intervention 
on the social structure of the scientific community.
A more damning challenge would target our assumptions about unification, for this 
may well entail that the social-epistemological dimensions are not relevant to unification. 
However, even here, the worst possible outcome is not so bad. As we have seen, our general 
constraints in §2.3 apply to a majority of the extant philosophical accounts. So, if only a few 
accounts of unification are to be pursued regardless of the scientific community’s structure, 
then these accounts will have a privileged status. Moreover, if these privileged accounts 
only involve “heterodox” views of unification (e.g., Cartwright 1999; Darden and Maull 
1977; Mitchell 2002), then this would require radical revision as to what ought be part of 
the conceptual or normative core of unification. Consequently, we take our challenge as a 
call to arms to re-envision the nature and purpose of unification.
14  Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this concern.
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